




This text is based on an introductory Keynote delivered by the author for a Plenary panel of 
Nordic researchers that took place during the 2008 ‘Media and Global Divides’ conference. 
Designed to provide an international stage-setting context for a range of Nordic perspec-
tives, the text first deconstructs the notions of ‘global’ and ‘divide’. It then takes up ‘global 
divides’ that are cultural in nature, referring principally to ‘divide’-related notions analyzed 
by various contributors to the two published volumes of the Cultures and Globalization 
Series, of which the author is co-editor. Finally, it seeks to displace the ‘divide’ metaphor, 
by attending to the complex relations of competition and collaboration that link different 
centres of cultural production, e.g., the spatial dynamics of film and television production as 
explored by Michael Curtin in the recently published second volume of the Series entitled 
The Cultural Economy. 
Keywords: cultural conflict; identity politics; cultural and media imperialism; film and tele­
vision; media capital.
Introduction
As a preliminary to this introductory exploration of the notion of ‘cultural’ divides, I 
propose to briefly unpack the terms of debate. At this conference – ‘Media and Global 
Divides’ – the master term is ‘global divides’. How might we parse this double­headed 
expression? What is the ‘global’? Does the term refer simply to phenomena encountered 
everywhere in the world? Or to phenomena that dominate the planet specifically because 
of the time-space compression that we call globalization? Or is the ‘global’ a higher 
level of overarching organization and process, a new whole at the planetary level that 
is more than the sum of its parts, endowed with an entelechy of its own? 
And what do we mean by ‘divides’? Are these, as in the original etymological mean-
ing of the word, mere dividing points or lines? Or watersheds? Or disjunctures? Is a 
‘divide’ something more than that: a disagreement, a conflict of interests, a schism? 
Or does the term connote a gross imbalance of power, a major asymmetry of access, a 
marked pattern of injustice, a glaring inequality of means? Should we perhaps, as Cees 
Hamelink read it in his James Halloran Memorial lecture, see the notion in a totally 
different frame of reference, as a deeply rooted dichotomy of mind-sets: between, as he 
put it, the spirit of absolutism and that of self­reflexivity? 
We tend to deploy all of these senses, and more, depending on the context and the 
situation. Perhaps we do this simply because both ‘global’ and ‘divide’ have joined the 
ranks of those floating signifiers that are now rife in the discourses of the social sciences 
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and the humanities. But in fact there is also a polysemy of meanings that is inherent 
in the issues involved; different disciplines and problematics may well have their own 
preferred meanings. 
Unfortunately, this state of affairs advances neither analytical rigour nor trans-
disciplinary communication… Be that as it may, for the purposes of the Cultures and 
Globalization Series we read the notion of a ‘divide’ in the following two ways: 
1. As a predicament common to all societies, whether it obtains within nation-states or 
between groups of societies thought to belong to particular geocultural regions or 
thought to display patterns of commonality or sameness. 
2. As oppositions or asymmetries at the level of the global ecumene, e.g. North-South, 
East-West, Islam-the West… 
In both cases, our work for the Series strongly suggests that we ought to conceptualize 
the ‘divides’ in more complex and nuanced ways than has tended to be the case so far. 
That said by way of introduction, I shall now briefly describe the project and review 
some divide-relevant issues that emerged from the 2007 volume on Conflicts and Ten-
sions and the 2008 volume on The Cultural Economy (Anheier and Isar 2007; 2008). 
The ‘Cultures and Globalization’ Series
Our point of departure of the project was that culture, its forms of creation, presentation 
and preservation, are broadly and deeply affected by globalization and in turn impact 
upon it — but in ways that are inadequately understood. Mapping the interactions be-
tween culture and globalization is the principal object of the Series.1 Our purpose in so 
doing is threefold: i) to analyze cultural transformations and their economic, social and 
political implications (and vice­versa); ii) to provide a platform for new perspectives in 
accessible, policy­relevant ways and iii) to substantiate these new perspectives empiri-
cally and quantitative data thereon in innovative ways. The project is academy-based, 
but also welcomes journalists, artists, and public intellectuals as contributors; its scope 
is truly international and multi­disciplinary; it calls on established as well as younger 
scholars; and it is entirely foundation­supported, notably by the Bank of Sweden Ter-
centenary Foundation, the Compagnia di San Paolo, the J. Paul Getty Trust, the Prince 
Claus Fund for Culture and Development and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. 
Each volume consists of overview essays resulting from fresh research on key is-
sues and trends, followed by analytical chapters and case studies on particular regions, 
topics, or fields. A distinct and major segment of each volume is the data section of 
indicator suites on cultural phenomena, trends, events, etc. all presented through very 
sophisticated and user-friendly information graphic methods. Each volume is also pre-
pared in the light of a conceptual framework, a set of lines of inquiry that are proposed 
to contributors in advance; the latter are also brought together at an ‘authors’ meeting’ 
organized midway through the writing process with a view to achieving a degree of 
coherence and cross-fertilisation rare in most collective volumes. 
Conflicts and Tensions
The conflicts and tensions that underly the ‘divide’ notion in the cultural realm were 
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the focus of the inaugural volume of the Series published in 2007. Strong anxieties lurk 
behind much of the present-day concern for culture understood in its multiple senses, 
but particularly in the ways of life or ‘culture as identity’ meaning (Eagleton 2000) in 
relation to globalization. The specter of conflict is ever­present: the cultural dimensions 
of conflict on the one hand, and the conflictual dimensions of culture on the other or, to 
put it differently, how any kind of group conflict can be ‘culturalized’ and how culture 
itself can become a party to the confrontation between particularisms. This connection 
between the two is a corollary of Appadurai’s ‘culturalism’: “the conscious mobiliza-
tion of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or transnational politics” 
(1996, p. 15) – by different agents and agencies, by ideologues of many different types 
and persuasion. This applies in particular to the question of cultural identities, both in-
dividual and collective, and to their forms of expression, maintenance, representation, 
recognition, and renewal. 
In this sense, then, the volume is about the interplay between globalization and 
‘identity politics’ in both local and global arenas. Understandably, several contributors 
address the issues against the now unavoidable backdrop of the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
thesis, which sees cultural difference as the principal ground for divergences that will 
lead inevitably, if not addressed, to violent conflict. ‘Globalization’ was the second term 
of our binomial.2 We therefore asked contributors to foreground the interactions between 
the forces of globalization and conflicts or tensions that they could understand as being 
‘cultural’ in one way or another, or at least linked to cultural factors, whether these con-
flicts or tensions are global or trans­national in their scope, cutting across geo­cultural 
regions, or whether they arise within nations – while bearing in mind our preference for 
the global or transnational articulation of these phenomena. We also invited our authors 
to examine two particular facets of culture­related conflict: i) how conflicts generated 
by globalization in other areas come to occupy a ‘cultural’ terrain and ii) how and why 
the cultural dimension itself may have its own inbuilt conflict and tension dynamics that 
might be either amplified or suppressed by globalization processes. Having set out the 
above conceptual framework and lines of inquiry, the more specific questions we asked 
contributors to address included the following. When is conflict ‘cultural’? Is culture 
agent or pawn in a range of conflictual situations? When and how do economic and/or 
political conflicts occupy a ‘cultural’ terrain? When does the cultural dimension itself 
have its own inbuilt conflict dynamics? How are conflicts and tensions either amplified 
or mitigated by globalization processes? 
Now obviously the 40 different authors approached these issues in hugely different 
ways; the point here is not to capture this variegation but to share a selection of find-
ings that speak to the notion of cultural conflicts as ‘divides’. In that spirit, one could 
cite the way in which the processes of liberalization (‘state shrinking’) accompanying 
globalization are weakening the capacity of public institutions to head off and/or man-
age culture­related conflicts in multi­ethnic societies. There are winners and losers, as 
different ethnic groups suffer or gain disproportionately; those with grievances (real or 
imagined) are easily instrumentalized here by ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ (Crawford 2007), 
in other words individuals or agencies that politicize cultural identity for political or 
economic gain. 
I could also cite a range of ‘fault lines’ explored. For example, the asymmetric 
relationships between ‘North’ and ‘South’ that implicitly favor the universalization of 
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western paradigms, stifle local production of culture, language, and memory, and thereby 
create considerable conflict potential. Or the divide between the ‘West’ and the ‘Arab 
World’, based upon still largely unaddressed historical traumas that become increas-
ingly vulnerable to memory wars, reinforced by double standards on both sides. Or the 
fault lines with Islam, generated by conflict­saturated discourse about the meaning and 
practice of the religion itself that has in turn led to acute tensions both within the Islamic 
umma and with the belief structures of other religions… 
Are cultural conflicts really ‘cultural’, we asked as well? Culture has its own dynamic, 
yet is embedded in economic, social and power relations; the ‘cultural’ is deployed in 
varying combinations with other societal dynamics, and what matters is the nature of 
these combinations, how they are nurtured or misused… Needless to say, the ‘clash of 
civilization’ thesis is also tackled in the volume, as the paradigmatic instance of a divide 
constructed at the global level. Our critique confirms the judgment already made by 
others such as Said that the thesis reifies and essentializes an abstract concept: ‘civili-
zation’. In point of fact, most culture­related conflicts occur within rather than between 
civilizations. Yet the ‘clash’ paradigm has enjoyed far greater currency than it deserves; 
after 9/11 it has been resuscitated and politicized. 
The Cultural Economy
In the 2008 volume, some 46 authors from 21 different countries explore the ‘cultural 
economy’, understood as the manifold forms of economic activity that produce outputs 
with significant aesthetic or semiotic content, or symbolic outputs. And they tackle 
framing questions such as the following. How does globalization affect the production, 
distribution and consumption of cultural goods and services? How does commodifica-
tion impact upon notions of cultural value? How are the relationships between cultural 
creators, producers and consumers being modified? How vibrant is the cultural economy 
in different countries and regions of the world? What are the policy challenges that 
societies face in this arena? While answering such questions, several contributors have 
explored ‘divides’ of ownership, agency and voice – divides that are at once ‘global’ 
because they occur between world regions such as North and South, or East and West, 
and ‘local’, by which I mean within regions or nations. While globalization has vastly 
extended the market reach and power of cultural producers in many cases, it has reduced 
them in many others. 
Hence the vigorous international debate on trade in cultural goods and services. Hence 
also the advocacy of such protocols as Open Knowledge, Open Archives, Open Access, 
Open Source. But given the power and reach of private interests in global capitalism, 
however, this advocacy is unlikely to be translated into practice. Instead, what may be 
expected is a continuing proliferation of small and micro-enterprises with the capacity to 
contest diverse markets through the enabling powers of new production and distribution 
technologies (Scott 2008). This is unlikely to challenge the power of large multinational 
corporations in the cultural economy, but these entities will find themselves to an ever 
increasing degree embedded in a long-tailed distribution made up of myriad small-scale 
niche producers. 
We have a predilection for the analytical insights of cultural and economic and 
cultural geography; for this reason, patterns of spatial concentration and dispersion in 
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cultural production, as explored by Michael Curtin, Andy Pratt and Allen Scott (2008) 
are foregrounded in the volume. These authors have studied the ways in which a growing 
number of cultural-products agglomerations is accompanied by a growing differentiation 
of outputs, as individual centers struggle to mobilize their place­specific competitive 
advantages and as they build up reputations for particular kinds of product designs 
and forms of semiotic expression. And in this context there are two key factors – the 
geographic diversification of productive efforts and the socio­spatial fragmentation of 
demand – that both seem to resist the processes through which certain producers and/or 
agglomerations establish monopoly powers in certain global market segments. Hence, 
for Allen Scott, 
globalization appears less and less to be resulting in a pattern of mass cultural 
uniformity. To the contrary, we seem to entering an era where cultural production 
is becoming increasingly polycentric and polysemic. The most evident expres-
sion of this state of affairs is the steady emergence of a world-wide mosaic of 
cultural production centers tied together in complex relations of competition and 
collaboration. (2008: 321)
Film and Television: The Persisting Spatial Dynamics
These ‘complex relations of competition and collaboration’ are a force field in which the 
‘divide’ metaphor necessarily has less purchase. They oblige us also to look afresh at the 
old ‘media imperialism’ critique, whose explanatory value has already been challenged 
on several counts. Because it failed to account for the diverse ways in which audiences 
make use of foreign media. Because it overlooked the growing influence of domestic 
media producers and failed to acknowledge the increasing prominence of transnational 
media production centers in cities such as Mumbai, Hong Kong, São Paulo or Lagos. 
Because it focused on national cinemas and national broadcasting systems, paying little 
attention to the increasingly complex and trans-border circulations of popular media. 
Because it privileged the United States as a central and organizing actor in the interna-
tional media economy. 
Instead of dominant power emanating from a single source, we see complex and 
contingent forces and flows at work in a multi­centric cultural economy, as the number 
of media producers, distributors, and consumers has grown dramatically, first in Europe 
and then in Asia, with China and India together adding almost two billion new view-
ers. These trends have been particularly well analyzed by Michael Curtin in his chapter 
entitled ‘Spatial Dynamics of Film and Television’ (2008: 215­226), and therefore I 
should like now to dip extensively into his analysis. 
Although powerful global media conglomerates were active contributors to these 
forces and flows, Curtin observes, local, national, and regional media firms expanded 
rapidly as well. In India, Rupert Murdoch’s Star TV presumed to displace the govern-
ment’s television monopoly but found itself beleaguered in turn by dozens of new 
indigenous competitors, many of them telecasting in one of the many sub-continental 
languages, all of them commercially driven. As a result, Star TV was forced to localize 
its programming and institutional practices, so as to adapt to competitive forces on the 
ground. In many other instances, global media corporations have had to adapt to local 
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conditions at the very same time that local film and television enterprises have become 
more globalized in their perspectives and practices. Rather than exhibiting patterns 
of domination and subordination, media institutions now appear to be responding to 
the push­pull dynamic of globalization, as increasing connectivity inspires significant 
changes in textual and institutional practices.
Hence the turn away from the idea of Western hegemony and towards the ways in 
which a larger set of processes operate trans-locally and interactively. In other words, 
rather than being an arena of centralized power, the world’s increasingly interconnected 
media environment is more and more the outcome of messy and complicated interac-
tions. These processes, observes Curtin, have led to the use of such adjectives as frac-
tal, disjunctive, or rhizomatic to characterize a complex terrain of textual circulation, 
reception, and appropriation. Yet even though these adjectives connote ruptures, screen 
industries have nevertheless followed fairly consistent patterns of operation for almost 
a century. The amount of production may have increased dramatically and the patterns 
of circulation may have grown much more complex, but the spatial dynamics of media 
capital have remained fairly consistent. Michael Curtin has catalogued three features of 
these dynamics: 1) the logic of accumulation; 2) trajectories of creative migration and 
3) forces of socio­cultural variation. It is to these that I now turn.
The Logic of Accumulation
The logic of accumulation presents at one and the same time the centripetal tendencies 
in the sphere of production and the centrifugal tendencies in distribution that Marx had 
in mind when he predicted that capital must ‘annihilate space with time’ if it is to over-
come barriers to accumulation. Even though a film or TV company may be founded with 
the aim of serving particular national cultures or local markets, it must at some point 
re-deploy its creative resources and reshape its terrain of operations if it is to survive 
competition and enhance profitability. The well­known history of the American cinema 
provides an instructive example of these tendencies. Similar patterns emerged in India, 
where big studios emerged in the Bombay area in the 1930s. In Chinese cinema as 
well, transnational cinema circuits were firmly in place by the thirties, but the mode of 
production was initially more dispersed. During the post-World War II era, as prosperity 
returned to the industry, both Cathay and Shaw Brothers established integrated produc-
tion operations in Hong Kong that rivaled the scope and productivity of their American 
counterparts. This capital-intensive factory model prevailed across the world, but unlike 
the auto or steel industries, filmmaking was in the business of distinctive prototypes 
rather than producing batches of products with interchangeable parts. Each commodity 
was relatively unique, even if production routines grew increasingly standardized and 
even if the films were intended for mass audiences. 
Trajectories of Creative Migration
The second feature of these spatial dynamics, argues Curtin, is made up of trajectories 
of creative migration: audiovisual industries are especially reliant on creativity as a 
core resource. Recurring demand for new prototypes requires pools of labor that are 
self-consciously motivated by aesthetic innovation as well as market considerations. 
Attracting and managing talent is one of the most difficult challenges that screen pro-
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ducers confront and they must also maintain access to reservoirs of specialized labor 
that replenish themselves on a regular basis. While media companies tend to cluster 
in particular cities, it is not just market forces, but also patterns of creative migration 
that come into at play – as centripetal tendencies that accentuate the centripetal logic 
of production. 
Why do Hollywood, Mumbai, and Hong Kong continue to act as magnets for cultural 
labor, asks Curtin? He finds the answer in the way the Post­Fordist mode of production 
encourages and sustains the agglomeration of creative labor because constant changes 
in product output require frequent transactions between contractors, subcontractors, 
and creative talent. This encourages studios to employ local subcontractors and talent 
because proximity allows directors and managers to oversee outsourced creative labor 
and to make changes more easily and more frequently. As for the workers, for obvious 
reasons they cluster where studios and subcontracting firms are based. What seems to 
be distinctive today is the ways in which the centripetal logic of capitalist production 
has been married to the equally centripetal trajectories of creative migration, engender-
ing the rise of several competing media capitals that are centers of creative migration 
in their own right. 
Forces of Socio-Cultural Variation
Because cities such as Hollywood, Mumbai, and Hong Kong lie across significant cul-
tural divides from each other, producers have been able to sustain distinctive product 
lines and survive the onslaught of distant competitors thanks to forces of socio-cultural 
variation. National and local institutions have been and remain significant actors despite 
the spatial tendencies of production and distribution. The early years of cinema were an 
exception because the logic of media capital unfolded relatively unimpeded by national 
regulation, but as the popularity of Hollywood narratives increased, many countries 
established policies to counter the growing influence of this new commodity form. By 
the 1920s, opinion leaders and politicians across the world began to grow wary of Holly-
wood and cultural critics began to clamor for regulation. Many countries imposed import 
quotas and content regulations on Hollywood films and some set up national film boards 
to subsidize cinema productions with national themes and talent. And at the same time, 
state­subsidized radio broadcasting began to provide various forms of insulation – the 
BBC has been the model and template here – accentuating national contours of difference 
in opposition to media capital’s need to operate on a smooth plane of market relations 
worldwide. Despite a very varied and uneven record across the world, regulation of the 
airwaves has provided an effective way for governments to refigure the centripetal and 
centrifugal tendencies of a capitalist regime of accumulation.
But self-conscious state policies are not the only forces that exploit socio-cultural 
variation. As Curtin observes, the media industries in Mumbai, Cairo, São Paulo, Bogotá 
or Hong Kong have also taken full advantage of social and cultural differences in their 
production and distribution practices. Operating across deep divides in terms of cultural 
inspiration and content from Hollywood et al., they have employed creative talent and 
cultural forms that resonate distinctively with their specific audiences. They have also 
made use of social networks and insider information to secure market advantages. Cul-
tural and national pride have always been invoked in their promotional campaigns. 
138
Conclusion
So rather than a landscape of stark divides, the spatial distribution of film and televi-
sion production, together with the other developments including those I have briefly 
explored as well, present a multi-polar picture of success and failure, of inclusion and 
exclusion. And yet, while this state of affairs would tend to invalidate the simplicities of 
the cultural homogenization thesis, it would be wrong to conclude that globalization is 
bound to operate in ways that remove or reduce inequities and asymmetries. Many real 
divides remain. As Andy Pratt observes, for example, “they take on an unsurprising pat-
tern dominated by corporate control in the North, and in cities, and a clustering around 
market places where consumers have high and growing disposable income’ (2008: 
47). These gate keeping functions include controls over (or surrender of) intellectual 
property rights, and distribution rights and, despite certain exceptions, seriously limit 
the possibility of using the developing world’s strength of ownership and innovation of 
creative ideas. Clearly, purely market driven system of cultural supply cannot transcend 
these predicaments. Instead, as Scott puts it, “an energetic but still in important respects 
prospective cultural politics (in the sense of self-conscious contestation of the symbolic 
content of economic outputs) is one of the necessary conditions of enhanced democratic 
order in the modern world” (2008: 321).
Notes
 1. Annabelle Sreberny noted perceptively in Stockholm that I chose not to unpack the term ‘culture’, the 
quintessential floating signifier. No doubt I shied away from doing so because the concept is even more 
entangled terminologically than the notion of ‘divide’ is. ‘Culture’ is replete with myriad differences, 
overlaps and nuances in meaning, as various disciplines appropriate it as their ‘terrain’ and in the process 
effectively turning into ‘silos’ that discourage cross-disciplinary dialogue. So let me repair that omission 
here. The operating definition we are using for the Series sees ‘culture’ as:
the social construction, articulation and reception of meaning. Culture is the lived and creative 
experience for individuals and a body of artifacts, symbols, texts and objects. Culture involves 
enactment and representation. It embraces art and art discourse, the symbolic world of meanings, 
the commodified output of the cultural industries as well as the spontaneous or enacted, organized 
or unorganized cultural expressions of everyday life, including social relations. It is constitutive of 
both collective and individual identity (Anheier and Isar, 2008: 3).
 2. The notion of globalization itself, almost as frustratingly as ‘culture’’ is the object of multiple theories 
and definitions. In the Series, we use the term to refer to the worldwide interconnections and interde-
pendencies that all have deep origins in world history but today are being increasingly and ever more 
rapidly brought about through the movement of objects (goods, services, finance and other resources, 
etc.), meanings (language, symbols, knowledge) and people across regions and intercontinental space. 
This notion of globalization as ‘time and space compression’ is not a normative concept: it is neither 
a business buzzword, nor a tool for miracle growth, nor the result of an evil plot (Chanda 2007), but 
simply the global connectivity that characterizes the way we live ever more closely ‘bound together’ in 
the world. 
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